The GMI Codebook provides an introduction to the concepts and definitions underlying the Global Militarisation Index. It discloses data sources used and gives an insight into the methodology applied. It also provides information on how we deal with missing data and the criteria that lead to data exclusion.

GMI Codebook: English / Deutsch

This year's GMI, which covers 149 countries, reflects in its first part on the various effects of the war in Ukraine on global militarisation. While some countries have experienced a decrease in militarization due to factors like growing GDP or population figures, global defense spending has increased overall. Western and Central Europe, for instance, witnessed a 13% rise in military spending, the largest since the Cold War. The Global Militarization Index (GMI) ranks the ten most militarized countries, with Ukraine topping the list, replacing Israel.

This year's regional section focuses on the post-Soviet space. The 15 states that became independent with the collapse of the Soviet Union are now highly militarised for a variety of reasons. On the one hand, many of them inherited large armies, arsenals and extensive, well-equipped paramilitary security apparatuses from the former Soviet era. On the other, the conflict between integration and independence, as well as conflicts with Russia and inter-state conflicts, are key drivers of militarisation in the region.

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• Global Militarisation Index 2023: English / German

The GMI 2022 covers 154 states and its first part reflects current developments. This year the GMI offers a seemingly contradictory picture. It appears that the general upward trend of the previous years is not continuing. This is mainly due to the drop in relative military expenditure, which, measured as a share of GDP (gross domestic product), fell on average from 2.3 to 2.2 per cent, which, in turn, is mainly due to the economic recovery after the Covid-19 pandemic. At the same time, despite a positive population trend, the number of heavy weapons increased in relative and absolute terms, reaching 396,914 this year, a figure last measured in 2012.

The second part of the GMI focuses on two regional aspects. For one, we will investigate the planned enlargement of NATO to include Sweden and Finland as member states. Using the three GMI parameters of personnel, financial resources and heavy weapons, we compare NATO with Russia and the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organisation). In addition, we take up the 100 billion special fund for the Bundeswehr and sketch out two different scenarios for the militarisation of Germany for the next five years. This year, the conflict between China, Taiwan and the so-called AUKUS countries (Australia, United Kingdom and United States) in the China Sea and the Pacific Ocean continued to escalate. The second regional focus is, therefore, on East Asia and Oceania. Here, we contrast the military potential of the AUKUS countries with that of China. We estimate the degree of militarisation of North Korea and Taiwan, two key countries in the regional conflict. However, as this estimate is based on divergent or older data sources, it is not included in the GMI dataset or the official ranking.

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• Global Militarisation Index 2022: English / German
• Background information: North Korea: English / German
• Background information: Taiwan: English / German
• GMI Appendix: English / German

The GMI 2021 is an anniversary edition. Its first part reflects, as usual, current developments, global and regional trends.In the regional focus on Europe, one overall trend of the GMI 2021 becomes particularly clear: Despite the decrease in global GDP as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, countries are spending more resources on the military in absolute terms and as a proportion of their economic output. Another regional focus this time is on Sub-Saharan Africa. In West Africa, in particular, the security situation has deteriorated dramatically over the past few years. Therefore, it is particularly interesting to look at the dynamics of militarisation on that continent.

The second part of the GMI looks at the global and regional development of militarisation over the past 20 years. This overall view of global militarisation between 2000 and 2020 shows that, except for an interim peak in 2005, it initially decreased steadily. Our resource-based concept of militarisation explains this as follows: It is due to the increase in the world’s population and that of global financial resources, which cause the proportion of the military sector in the GMI to decrease from 2000 to 2018. This, however, does not imply “true demilitarisation”, as is evidenced by the absolute increase in military spending over the period under review (SIPRI, 2020). Since 2019, this trend has reversed again. In the past two years, rising militarisation can be observed again across the globe, mainly because the resources allocated to the military are increasing in absolute and in relative terms.

The regional focus of the GMI 2020 is on Europe (eastern Europe/ NATO and EU-countries) as well as the Asia–Pacific region and look in-depth into the role of the United States there. Russia (ranked 8th) continues to sustain one of the largest military forces in the world. The European NATO countries, especially Baltic and eastern European countries, are continuing to arm themselves, pointing to ongoing tensions with Russia. The still smouldering conflict between Armenia (ranked 2nd) and Azerbaijan (ranked 16th) over the Nagorno-Karabakh region continues to keep militarisation in the South Caucasus at a very high level. One look at the Top 10 shows that all countries in the Middle East are highly militarised by global comparison—only four countries are not from this region. The strategic rivalry between China (position 98) and the United States (position 27) for influence in the Asia–Pacific region intensifies the mutual threat perceptions and contributes to an arms build-up there.

Finally, the GMI 2020 looks at the link between militarisation and health security. A comparison with the Global Health Security (GHS) Index shows that countries with an average level of militarisation perform best in health security overall. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the public budgets of many countries are likely to come under severe pressure in the coming years as a result of new borrowing. This may also affect militarisation. Should the economic performance drop proportionally more than military spending, this would increase the level of militarisation. But it is also possible that prevention against future threats to health security will be given precedence over defence policy, and that significant cuts in military spending will be introduced. Which of the two scenarios will play out is likely to depend on the political priorities countries will choose.

The regional focus of the GMI 2019 is on Europe (Eastern Europe / NATO and EU countries), the Middle East and Asia. Russia (position 6) continues to sustain one of the largest military forces in the world. The European NATO countries, especially Baltic and eastern European states, are again continuing to arm themselves pointing to ongoing tensions with Russia. The unresolved secessionist conflict between Armenia (position 3) and Azerbaijan (position 10) over the Nagorno-Karabakh region continues to keep militarisation in the South Caucasus at a very high level. The countries in the Middle East are all highly militarised by global standards. In view of the tense security situation, Israel (position 1) is again at the top of the global ranking in 2019. The list of highly militarised countries in Asia is headed, as in previous years, by Singapore (position 2). In absolute figures, China (position 94) invests most in its armed forces in a regional comparison. Other countries in the region are also increasingly investing in their armed forces, citing the various conflicts with China.

Finally, this year's GMI looks at the link between militarisation and fragility. A comparison of the GMI with the typology of fragility constellations drawn up by the Constellations of State Fragility Project of the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) points, for example, to a connection between the very low level of militarisation of a country and its limited ability to provide pivotal state-run services for its citizens. Conversely, however, this does not mean that the highest possible level of militarisation is desirable. For example, among the very highly militarised countries, there are a strikingly high number of countries that score poorly on the fragility dimension of legitimacy.

The GMI 2018 has a regional focus on Europe. The pressure exercised by the United States on European NATO countries to increase their military budgets has resulted in the fact that nearly all European member states have spent more money on the military than in the previous year. The number of military personnel and major weapons systems has also increased in many European countries. While Russia, again, is one of the most militarized countries worldwide, it drastically reduced its military spending in 2017 compared to the previous year. Despite dwindling revenues from the oil trade, militarization in the Middle East remains, by international standards, at a very high level. All countries in the region, with the exception of Iraq (position 41), can be found among the 30 most heavily militarized countries in the world. Algeria (position 15) and Morocco (position 24) are among the heavily militarized countries in North Africa. But most African countries, particularly those of Sub-Saharan Africa, can be found in the bottom part of the ranking.

This year’s GMI also examines the connection between particularly high or low militarization and the political system of the respective countries. In doing so, it refers to the data from the Freedom House Index and the Polity IV Project of the Center for Systemic Peace. A quite ambiguous picture can be found: It is true that there are significantly more Not Free countries and autocracies among the countries with particularly high militarization levels than among those with particularly low levels. But, conversely, a low level of militarization, does not automatically go along with a high level of freedom of political system but often points to weak state structures and, thus, less control by the state.

The ten countries that have the highest levels of militarization for the year 2016 are Israel, Singapore, Armenia, Russia, South Korea, Kuwait, Jordan, Cyprus, Greece and Brunei. These countries allocate particularly high levels of resources to the armed forces in comparison to other areas of society. For some countries that are included in the top 20 militarized countries in the world, the sharp decline in the price of oil has led to a reduction in military expenditures: Oman, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia but also Azerbaijan. In South American countries too, especially in Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and Mexico, the drop in oil prices caused military spending to fall more or less significantly. One regional focus of the GMI 2017 is the Americas: The two most militarized countries in the region are Cuba and the United States. US military spending increased again for the first time since 2009 and, at US $611 billion, was the highest in the world. While the countries of Central America and the Caribbean, with the exception of Cuba, show a relatively low level of militarization, the South American states can be found more in the upper mid-range.

This year’s GMI also positions the degree of militarization relative to Transparency International’s Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index. The defence sector is particularly opaque and vulnerable: Corrupt elites negotiate arms deals which, even though they frequently make little sense from a military point of view, help to make them rich. The comparison of the indices shows clearly, however, that the risk of corruption does not by any means only occur in highly militarized countries but also in many countries with comparatively low levels of militarization, indicating deficits in the security sector and weak state institutions.

Following the annexation of Crimea by Russia in particular and the continuing conflict in eastern Ukraine, the security situation in Europe has changed. While, for 2015, eastern European states in particular have shown a marked increase in militarization, a similar trend cannot be observed for most western European countries. Against the background of protracted conflicts in the Middle East, the level of militarization of most countries remains high. Israel is still at the top and Jordan on position four. It will be interesting in the coming years to see how oil prices, which have sharply fallen since mid-2014, will affect the militarization of the Gulf States and their extensive weapons purchases. Singapore, South Korea and Brunei are also in the top 10. It remains to be seen how the tensions from the territorial disputes in the South China Sea and connected modernization and armament efforts will shape the level of militarization in Asia.

This year’s GMI highlights the relationship between the level of militarization and the Global Hunger Index, which defines the causes of hunger not only in economic or climate change terms but also with regard to instability or violent conflict. The fact that most states suffering from hunger also have comparatively low levels militarization shows that a low level of militarization often does not point to a peaceful society but more often than not to a weak security sector and the absence of a safe environment. But, within the 20 states that suffer the most from hunger, there are also countries with a relatively high level of militarization. There, high investment is tied up in military resources that would otherwise be available to fight against hunger or to invest in the health system.

The region with the highest level of militarisation is again the Middle East. This upward trend must be seen in connection with the violent conflicts across the region—the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the war in Yemen, the civil war in Syria, and the regional threat posed by the so-called Islamic State (IS). In Europe, too, we find high levels of militarisation. Current crises, not least the war in eastern Ukraine, could become the factor that will push up defence budgets going forward. There is also a local arms race between Armenia and Azerbaijan triggered by the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict. The United States and China are absent from the GMI Top 10, despite being global leaders in military spending. This is because when their military expenditures are measured as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) and their military headcount and heavy weapon system numbers are measured per 1,000 inhabitants, the situation looks rather different. It should be noted, though, that these two powers are following the widespread trend towards restructuring and modernisation of the armed forces.

Included for the first time in the 2015 GMI report is an examination of the relationships between militarisation and human development by considering the Human Development Index (HDI). For stronger economies, we find that a high GMI ranking is often accompanied by a high HDI value (Israel, Singapore). And at the opposite end of the spectrum there are cases such as Liberia and Sierra Leone where we have to ask whether the low levels of militarisation might be adversely affecting human development. The relationship between militarisation and human development may again differ in countries where a high GMI is combined with a low HDI, such as Chad, or Mauretania. Here, disproportionately high spending on the armed forces may be taking critical resources away from development.

The causes for the generally high levels of militarisation in the Middle East are manifold. They range from the defence of existing authoritarian regimes against possible internal adversaries to external conflicts and potential threats from the outside. All in all, one will have to assume that the level of militarisation in the region will remain high or will even increase. The neighbouring states Armenia (rank 3) and Azerbaijan (rank 10), both belonging to Europe, show very high levels of militarisation and have initiated major increases in their military expenditures over the past years. The high levels of militarisation in these two countries must, however, be seen in the overall context. Russia (rank 5) delivers arms to both South Caucasian republics and has been pursuing a comprehensive military reform since 2008. Between 2009 and 2013, expenditures for equipment and procurement in European NATO states fell by more than US $ 9 billion. Still, some states show high levels of militarisation (Greece: 9, Estonia: 21, Turkey: 24, Bulgaria: 27, Portugal: 28). Singapore (rank 2) and South Korea (rank 7) are the two countries within East Asia that are amongst the ten most militarised countries in the world. Singapore’s procurement efforts are a reaction to its many unresolved territorial issues, the importance of strategic waterways in the region and the Chinese anti-access / area denial strategy. South Korea’s high level of militarisation can be understood in the context of the ongoing state of war with North Korea, but also with unresolved territorial issues with Japan and China in the Yellow Sea.